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Abstract 
Multinational companies can shift profit and income between branches in order to reduce the overall tax 
liabilities of the company. The result is a tax competition between countries. In this paper we consider 
the sequential choice of tax rates to illustrate the potential effects of tax leadership. We use a profit 
shifting model with multinational firms that operate in two countries, large and small. Governments 
compete by setting source-based corporate income taxes. We show that: (i) the sequential tax equilibria 
always Pareto dominate the simultaneous tax equilibrium. (ii) Each country prefers to follow than to 
lead the tax game. (iii) The tax leadership by the large country risk-dominates the tax leadership by the 
small country. Therefore our analysis provides a plausible explanation for the endogenous emergence of 
the tax leader- ship by the large countries. The results are contrasting with previous results in the 
literature. 
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1 Introduction
Globalization has prompted the emergence of multinational firms with di-
visions in different countries. It posed challenges for tax authorities across
the world. Indeed, the widely used source-based taxation creates an incen-
tive for multinational companies to shift profit and income between branches
in order to reduce the overall tax liabilities of the company (Devereux and
Griffith (2003) and Auerbach et al. (2010)). As a result countries that
previously exploited their positions as leaders in setting tax rates by impos-
ing high corporate tax rates increasingly found themselves competing with
other jurisdictions to attract mobile investment and profits. In this context,
small countries are generally thought to face the most elastic corporate tax
bases, and therefore to have the strongest incentives to offer low corporate
tax rates.1 Whether countries actually design their policies based on these
assumed elasticities is another matter. Hines (2005) finds that in 1982, small
countries had an average tax rate of 38.9 percent, while the average for large
countries was 43.7 percent. In 1999, the average small country tax rate was
31.1 percent, and the average large country tax rate was 33.8 percent. Pro-
gressive reduction of the effects of country sizes on corporate tax rates is one
of the implications of intensified international tax competition, since it is the
ability to exploit market power that permits large countries to benefit from
higher tax rates.
The presence of profit shifting is not so easy to detect, but it is getting
some convincing empirical support. Mintz and Smart (2003) in a study of
Canadian firms distinguishes between firms that operate in multiple jurisdic-
tions which may engage in income shift, and firms that operate in a single
jurisdiction. According to their preferred estimate, the elasticity of taxable
income with respect to corporate income tax rates for “income shifting” firms
is 4.9, compared with 2.3 for other, comparable firms.2
Confronting the profit shifting, the arm’s length principle can sound at-
tractive, but in reality, adjustments at most result in a poor approximation.
1Theoretically, there are possible mitigating factors such as strategic behavior and
distortions induced by other policies. While there are few tests of the proposition that
the supply of capital to small countries is more elastic than the supply of capital to
large countries, they do not matter that much, because, in most models, it follows as an
implication of the relatively small domestic corporate tax bases in small countries.
2Bartelsmann and Beetsma (2001) find that more than 65 percent of the additional
revenue resulting from a unilateral tax increase is lost because of income shifting even
among countries. Clausing (2003) and Swenson (2001) find that taxation has a significant
effect on intra-firm prices. IMF (2011) uses Bankscope data on banks to find that 1
percent-point higher tax rate reduces reported fiscal profits by between 6 and 8.5 percent.
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3 Alternative solution to the transfer pricing regulation is to use the formula
apportionment (FA) rule as in the USA and Canada for the allocation of
income across states. However, FA requires significant international coordi-
nation among the countries where a particular multinational company has
operations, since each country would like to pick the distribution rule that is
the most favorable to itself.4
The main obstacle to international coordination is the absence of global
institutional structures. In a recent paper, Hindriks et al. (2013) propose
a solution based on a system of voluntary tax sharing among asymmetric
countries. They also contrast this voluntary tax sharing agreement with the
standard fiscal equalization scheme. In this paper, we suggest the possible
emergence of international tax leadership as a form of commitment on tax
setting. In our framework, the equilibrium outcome is the tax leadership by
large (core) countries in which smaller (periphery) countries would respond
in setting their own taxes. This can be viewed as a form of partial coordi-
nation where there is no need of international tax agency. This approach
is somewhat related to Cooper’s (1986) argument that in price competition
setting, firms may develop devices, such as the most-favored customer price
clause, to coordinate on a preferable price leadership outcome with symme-
try among firms. We seek to extend this argument to tax competition with
asymmetry between tax jurisdictions. A relevant device to coordinate on the
tax leadership outcome could then be some form of most-favored country tax
clause.
In most tax competition models, it is assumed that countries set taxes
simultaneously. But Schelling (1960) pointed out that the viability of the
simultaneous-move equilibrium becomes dubious once countries’ commit-
ment is considered. Some countries can rely on their relative size to take the
leadership in the tax competition game, with smaller size countries following.
There is a small literature in which tax leadership by the large countries is
assumed but not demonstrated.5 On the other hand, Hamilton and Slutsky
3Adjustments based on the arm’s length principle can lead to double taxation if the
tax authorities in two jurisdictions do not agree on the price to be charged. Moreover,
transactions within the group are specific with no equivalent market price, and the valu-
ation of intangibles and royalty payments between related branches is a real challenge for
tax authorities.
4The EU’s attempt to bring about an FA union is, at best, a half-measure because even
if small numbers of countries in which multinational companies are operating are left out
of this FA union, the problem of transfer pricing will persist.
5Wang (1999) assumed that the larger country is the Stackelberg leader, and compared
the outcome with the Nash outcome. Baldwin and Krugman (2004) used the model with
economies of agglomeration to explain why tax rates remain higher in the core country
than in the periphery, by assuming that the core country moves first.
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(1990) dealt with the issue of endogenous timing by using pre-play stage.
This approach has been mostly used in industrial organization, notably by
Amir and Stepanova (2006), who developed the endogenous timing game in
a Bertrand duopoly game with strategic complementarities in prices. They
obtained the result that the strong (low-cost) firm is the leader if the cost
asymmetry is high enough.6 More recently Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010,
2011) have adopted this approach in tax competition models, respectively in
a capital mobility model, and in a cross-border shopping model. Their main
finding is that under some restrictions on the countries asymmetry, the small
country would lead in the equilibrium of endogenous timing game.
We will revisit Kempf and Rota-Graziosi’s (2010, 2011) results using in-
stead a profit mobility model (instead of capital mobility model or cross
border shopping model). We will use the model developed by Hindriks et
al. (2013) with two countries of different market sizes and two multinational
firms with branches in each country. We show that the Nash equilibrium in
taxes is Pareto dominated by the Stackelberg equilibria in taxes. We also
show that each country has a second-mover advantage no matter the differ-
ence in market sizes. Lastly, we show that the leadership by the large country
is preferable (in the risk dominance sense) to the leadership by the small
country, which is the opposite of the Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010,2011).
We attribute the difference to their implicit assumption on the tax response
elasticity.
2 The model
The model used follows closely Hindriks et al. (2013). There are two coun-
tries and two multinationals. The two countries are denoted by 1 and 2. A
homogeneous good is produced. The market size in each country is charac-
terized by the following linear (inverse) demands
p1(q1) = γ1 − βq1 and p2(q2) = γ2 − βq2, (1)
where different market size is represented by γ1>γ2, so that country 1 is the
large country with a higher demand for the good. This is equivalent to say
that countries differ in population size (obviously alternative interpretation
could be that countries differ in income per capita with the rich country 1
displaying higher willingness to pay for the good).
Two multinational firms, a and b, have branches in each country and
compete a` la Cournot in each national market. The unit production cost is
6On the other hand, in Cournot duopoly model, Amir and Grilo (1999) obtained the
opposite timing with the weak (high-cost) firm as the leader.
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normalized to zero; so is the cost of shipping goods across countries. Multi-
national firms may, at some cost, shift profits between branches so as to
minimize their total tax liability. Let piji = pi(q
a
i + q
b
i )q
j
i be the profit ef-
fectively generated by firm j = a, b in country i = 1, 2, associated with
production decisions (qai , q
b
i ), i = 1, 2. The firm must decide how much profit
to report in country i, p˜iji , subject the constraint that total reported profit
equals total realized profit p˜ij1 + p˜i
j
2 = pi
j
1 + pi
j
2. The cost of profit shifting is
convex and non-fiscally deductible with for i = 1, 2 and j = a, b
C
(
piji , p˜i
j
i
)
= 2δ
(
piji − p˜iji
)2
,
where δ is a scaling cost parameter.7 This may reflect the cost of hiring
accounting experts, the expected fine to be paid to the government, or the
expected market sanction when caught cheating on tax liabilities. The pa-
rameter δ captures the intensity of competition. The cost of profit shifting is
also independent of the direction of shifting (outward and inward shiftings
are cost-equivalent).
Government i sets a source-based tax rate ti on the profit reported within
its jurisdiction by multinational firms. Tax revenue in country i is
Ri = ti
(
p˜iai + p˜i
b
i
)
= ti p˜ii.
We assume that governments seek to maximize their fiscal revenue.8 Adding
the consumer surplus in the governmental objective function will not affect
the analysis, because in this profit shifting model consumer surplus is inde-
pendent of the tax choices. We assume that ti ≤ 1, for i = 1, 2.
The sequence of events is as follows. First, both countries choose their
tax rates so as to maximize their tax revenue. Second, given tax choices,
multinational firms compete a` la Cournot on each local market and choose
a level of production in each country and the fraction of profit to be shifted
to low-tax jurisdiction.
Proceeding backwards, we analyze firms’ decisions in each country, given
the tax choices made at the previous stage. Firms determine the quantities
to produce in each market and the amount of profit shifting. The problem of
firm a is to maximize
(1− t1)p˜ia1 + (1− t2)p˜ia2 − 2δ(pia1 − p˜ia1)2,
7See also Nielsen et al. (2005), Peralta et al. (2006), Amerighi and Peralta (2010), and
Swenson (2001). See also Huizinga and Laeven (2008) for a slightly different specification.
8See Hindriks et al. (2013) for a justification of this objective function.
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subject to p˜ia1 + p˜i
a
2 = p1(q
a
1 + q
b
1)q
a
1 + p2(q
a
2 + q
b
2)q
a
2 , with the inverse demand
function given by (1). Hindriks et al. (2013) showed the following:
qai = q
b
i = γi/(3β), pi = γi/3, pi
a
i = pi
b
i = γ
2
i /(9β), i = 1, 2.
Namely, productions and prices are not dependent on ti’s.
9 We can normalize
production by assuming γ1 =
3
2
√
β(1 + ²), γ2 =
3
2
√
β(1− ²) with ² ∈ (0, 1).
Then minimizing each multinational firm’s total tax liabilities subject to the
concealment cost gives the total profit reported in country i, p˜ii = p˜i
a
i + p˜i
b
i in
the equilibrium:
p˜i1 =
1 + ²
2
− t1 − t2
2δ
, p˜i2 =
1− ²
2
+
t1 − t2
2δ
(2)
The aggregate profit is therefore equal to 1 regardless of the tax choices, mak-
ing the tax game a zero-sum game. Note that for identical taxes t1 = t2 the
distribution of aggregate profits between two countries is solely determined by
the market size parameter ², i.e., p˜i1(t, t) = (1+ ²)/2 and p˜i2(t, t) = (1− ²)/2.
Firms shift profits according to the tax difference (t1 − t2) and the cost pa-
rameter δ.
Notice that if countries cooperate, they would maximize the joint fiscal
revenue
t1
(
1 + ²
2
− t1 − t2
2δ
)
+ t2
(
1− ²
2
+
t1 − t2
2δ
)
which leads to the cooperative optimal taxes to1 = t
o
2 = 1, and maximal joint
fiscal revenue equal to 1.
3 Tax competition
We now move to the first-stage game where both countries choose their tax
rates. We will compare the simultaneous Nash equilibrium obtained in Hin-
driks et al. (2013) with the two possible Stackelberg equilibria, where either
the large country leads, or the small country leads. We will then study the
timing game in Section 4 by allowing the “pre-play” stage, in which the coun-
tries simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide whether to move “early”
or “late”, leading to one of the three tax-games. This will determine which
of these three tax games can emerge as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the
extended “pre-play” timing game.
9Given the non-deductibility of profit-shifting cost, the firms’ production decisions are
independent of tax rates. Therefore adding consumer surplus in the objective function
will not affect the governmental choices of taxes.
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3.1 Simultaneous game
This game is already analyzed in Hindriks et al. (2013), and so we will give
a brief account. At the simultaneous-move game, each country noncoopera-
tively chooses its own tax rate. Given t2, the government of country 1 chooses
t1 to maximize
R1(t1, t2) = t1
(
1 + ²
2
− t1 − t2
2δ
)
.
which yields the tax reaction function of country 1
tˆ1(t2) = δ
1 + ²
2
+
t2
2
. (3)
Similarly, the tax reaction function of country 2 is
tˆ2(t1) = δ
1− ²
2
+
t1
2
. (4)
It is interesting to note that the reaction functions differ only by the in-
tercepts, with higher intercept for the large country 1. In our model, the
large country has greater market power in the tax setting, which is related
to the vertical intercept of the reaction function. This is similar to Amir
and Stepanova (2006) in which the firms’ cost asymmetry implies different
markups. On the other hand, in the capital mobility model of Kempf and
Rota-Graziosi (2010), country’s asymmetry translates into different slopes of
the reaction functions. In fact, both our model and Kempf and Rota-Graziosi
(2010) yield higher tax base elasticities by small countries which was thought
to be a key parameter for the analysis. However we will show shortly that
what matters for the optimal leadership choice is the slope of the tax reaction
functions which we call tax response elasticities.10 Notice also that taxes are
strategic complements which is due to the positive tax externality. The Nash
equilibrium taxes are,
tN1 = δ
3 + ²
3
and tN2 = δ
3− ²
3
.
To insure interior solution, we assume throughout the rest of the paper that
the profit shifting problem is binding and restrains tax choices.
δ ≤ δ¯ = 2
3 + ²
< 1.
10In Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010, Section 4), the production functions are given by
Fi(Ki) = (a − biKi)Ki (i = 1, 2) with b2 > b1, so firms in (small) country 2 are less
productive than in (large) country 1, which brings different tax base elasticities (their
“capital elasticities”). On the other hand, the tax reaction function is given by tˆi(tj) =
bj(tj + 2K¯bj)/(bi + 2bj). The large country displays a greater tax response elasticity
(∂tˆ1/∂t2 > ∂tˆ2/∂t1).
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The tax rate difference tN1 − tN2 = 2δ²/3 implies that both firms shift
profits from the large to the small country. However, this profit shifting is
not enough to offset the market size effect, and the large country ends up
with a larger tax base in equilibrium,
p˜iN1 =
1
2
+
²
6
, p˜iN2 =
1
2
− ²
6
.
With a larger tax base and a higher tax rate, the large country also ends up
with higher fiscal revenue in equilibrium,
RN1 =
δ
18
(3 + ²)2, RN2 =
δ
18
(3− ²)2
3.2 Stackelberg games
Two Stackelberg games can be considered, depending on which country takes
the leadership.
Begin with the case in which (large) country 1 leads. Applying backward
induction, (small) country 2, as the follower, chooses t2, given t1. Antici-
pating the best response of country 2 in (4), country 1, as the Stackelberg
leader, maximizes R1(t1, tˆ2(t1)) with respect to t1. The first-order condition
is11
dR1(t1, tˆ2(t1))
dt1
=
1 + ²
2
− t1 − tˆ2(t1)
2δ
+ t1
(−1
2δ
(
1− 1
2
))
= 0.
which gives the equilibrium tax rate of the Stackelberg leader, denoted by
tL1 , as
tL1 = δ
3 + ²
2
.
Substituting into (4), country 2’s best tax response, denoted by tF2 , is
tF2 = δ
5− ²
4
.
The tax differential is tL1 − tF2 = δ(1 + 3²)/4, so that firms shift profits from
the large leading country to the small following country. The equilibrium
distribution of tax bases is,
p˜iL1 =
3
8
+
²
8
, p˜iF2 =
5
8
− ²
8
.
11Notice that the revenue function is concave in the tax rate, d2R1(t1, tˆ2(t1))/dt21 =
−1/(2δ) < 0.
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Hence, contrarily to the Nash equilibrium, in this Stackelberg equilibrium
the profit-shifting effect more than offsets the market size effect, so that the
large leading country ends up with a smaller tax base. This is the result of
tax leadership that enables the small country to steal more profit from the
leading country by undercutting tax. The tax revenues are
RL1 =
δ
16
(3 + ²)2, RF2 =
δ
32
(5− ²)2
There are offsetting effects between the tax-rates differences (tL1 > t
F
2 ) and
the tax-base differences (p˜iL1 < p˜i
F
2 ). As a result, the larger country only ends
up better off if the size asymmetry is large enough.
RL1 ≷ RF2 ⇐⇒ ² ≷ ²∗ ≈ 0.314. (5)
When ² is large enough, the market-size effect dominates the cost of tax
leadership. This is the opposite when ² is small enough. In particular for
arbitrary small asymmetry, the tax leader is necessarily worse off.
The countries’ difference is limited to the parameter ², thus the second
Stackelberg equilibrium in which (the small) country 2 leads can be easily
obtained by analogy. The equilibrium taxes, given by (tF1 , t
L
2 ) are
tF1 = δ
5 + ²
4
, tL2 = δ
3− ²
2
.
With size symmetry, the follower will necessarily tax less. With size asym-
metry, the tax difference is tF1 − tL2 = δ(3²− 1)/4, so that firms shift profits
from the large to the small country if and only if ² > 1/3. When ² is large
enough, the market-size effect dominates the follower incentive to undercut
tax. This is the opposite when ² is small enough. The equilibrium tax bases
distribution is,
p˜iF1 =
5
8
+
²
8
, p˜iL2 =
3
8
− ²
8
.
When the small country leads, both the advantage to follow and the market-
size effect reinforce each other to increase the large country’s tax bases.
Therefore large country always ends up with more revenue in equilibrium.
RF1 =
δ
32
(5 + ²)2, RL2 =
δ
16
(3− ²)2
RF1 > R
L
2 for all ² ∈ (0, 1).
Naturally, the cost of shifting profit measured by δ, affects tax levels in
equilibrium: lower δ exacerbates the tax competition between countries and
reduces the equilibrium taxes and revenue. It is straightforward to conclude
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that if δ < δ¯ the joint tax revenue generated by the competitive outcome is
smaller than under the cooperative outcome. This allows us to state our first
proposition.
Proposition 3.1 In the Nash equilibrium as well as the two Stackelberg equi-
libria, there is under-taxation and joint tax revenue is sub-optimal. If profit
shifting becomes easier (i.e., if δ decreases) Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium
taxes decrease, and so does joint tax revenue.
3.3 Comparison of the tax games
Lemma 1 The equilibrium tax rates are ranked as follows: (i) For all ² ∈
(0, 1) and δ < δ¯, tN1 < t
F
1 < t
L
1 and t
N
2 < t
F
2 < t
L
2 . (ii) For all ² ∈ (0, 1) and
δ < δ¯, tN1 > t
N
2 and t
L
1 > t
F
2 . (iii) t
F
1 < t
L
2 if and only if ² < 1/3.
Given the strategic complementarity (due to positive externalities in the
tax game), in any Stackelberg equilibrium, tax rates are higher than the
rates obtained at the Nash equilibrium. This is a general implication of su-
permodular games in which both reaction functions are increasing (Milgrom
and Roberts, 1990). The leader can induce a favorable increase in the tax
rate of its rival by increasing its own tax rate. As a result, the tax leader is
induced to tax above the Nash level, and due to the strategic complemen-
tarity, the follower will also tax above the Nash level. On the other hand,
the Stackelberg follower tends to undercut the tax rate in order to expand
its own tax base.
Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) pointed out in the capital mobility
model that small countries tax less. The same results hold in the profit
mobility model with the Nash equilibrium (tN1 > t
N
2 ) and the Stackelberg
equilibrium where the large country leads (tL1 > t
F
2 ). However, when the
small country leads, tF1 > t
L
2 if (and only if) ² > 1/3 and so the small country
may end up taxing more in equilibrium when leading the tax competition
game. A similar result is obtained in Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010).
We define the concept of “second-mover advantage” as follows:
Definition 3.1 Country i has a second-mover advantage if RFi > R
L
i .
Comparing the payoffs derived, we establish the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2 The equilibrium tax revenues are ranked as in Figure 1: (i)
For all ² ∈ (0, 1) and δ < δ¯, both countries have a second-mover advantage in
tax competition. (ii) For all ² ∈ (0, 1) and δ < δ¯, RN1 > RN2 and RF1 > RL2 .
(iii) RL1 < R
F
2 if and only if ² < ²
∗.
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Figure 1: Tax Revenues
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Start with the case of symmetry (² = 0). From Lemma 1, both countries
tax more in the Stackelberg equilibrium than in the Nash equilibrium . Due
to positive externalities, both RLi and R
F
i are higher than R
N
i (i = 1, 2).
When country 1 leads, the follower’s revenue gap (RF2 −RL1 ) is first positive
but decreasing in ² for ² ≤ ²∗, and then the gap becomes negative when
² is high (i.e., RF2 − RL1 < 0 for ² > ²∗). This suggests that the relative
size can to some extent offset the second-mover advantage. However, this
does not mean that the large country would not prefer to be the follower.
Alternatively when country 2 leads, the follower’s revenue gap (RF1 −RL2 ) is
always positive and increases in ² for all ² ∈ (0, 1).
We now contrast our second-mover advantage result with several previous
papers. Firstly, using a capital mobility model, Kempf and Rota-Graziosi
(2010) obtain a first-mover advantage by the small country for sufficient
productivity differences. In their model the country asymmetry (marginal
productivity of capital) translates into difference in the slopes of the reac-
tion functions (see earlier footnote). Therefore, tax leadership by the small
country can induce a greater favorable reaction in the tax rate of the fol-
lowing large country, than the other way round. On the other hand, in our
model the asymmetry in market size translates into different intercepts but
the same slopes of the reaction functions in (3) and (4), and the leadership of
the large country emerges from the fact that the large country has a stronger
incentive to tax than the small one. It is worth noting that the different tax
base elasticities, that have been obtained in most models of asymmetric tax
competition, including ours,12 are logically independent of the tax response
elasticities implicitly assumed in Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010). Secondly,
Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2011), building upon Kanbur and Keen (1993) and
Wang’s (1999) cross-border shopping model, obtain a first-mover advantage
for the small country when asymmetry is sufficient. The difference with our
model is that they use asymmetry in population densities whereas we use
asymmetry in population sizes. Compared to France, Belgium is smaller in
population size, but larger in population densities. This is relevant distinc-
tion but again, the first-mover advantage they obtain is partly driven by the
induced difference in the tax response elasticity of each country.13 Lastly,
12Tax base elasticities in our profit mobility model are −∂p˜i1
∂t1
t1
p˜i1
=
t1
δ(1 + ²)− t1 + t2
and −∂p˜i2
∂t2
t2
p˜i2
=
t2
δ(1− ²) + t1 − t2 in each country. As in most models, this elasticity,
evaluated at equal tax rates, is higher for the small country.
13Strictly speaking, another factor for the small country’s first-mover advantage in
Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2011) is the shifts in the intercepts of the reaction functions,
depending on the location of the cross-shoppers (Figure 2 of Kanbur and Keen, 1993).
12
in Amir and Stepanova’s (2006) Bertrand duopoly game, the strong (low-
cost) firm has a first-mover advantage when cost asymmetry is high. In our
model it is impossible even though the second-mover advantage decreases as
asymmetry increases.
According to the benefit of smallness in the capital-tax competition liter-
ature (Bucovetsky, 1991), the small country has a higher payoff than the large
country in the tax competition equilibrium. In our setup of profit-shifting,
the small country has a higher payoff (fiscal revenue) only when the large
country leads and the asymmetry is small enough. Under the Nash equi-
librium and the Stackelberg equilibrium where the small country leads, the
large country has a higher fiscal revenue than the small one in the competitive
equilibrium.14
4 A timing game
A timing game, as suggested in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), is defined
as follows. At the “pre-play” stage, the countries simultaneously and non-
cooperatively decide whether to move “early” or “late”. After the timing
choice of each country is announced, the relevant tax competition game stud-
ied in the previous sections is played. Namely, if both players choose to move
early (strategy Early) or late (strategy Late), the following tax competition
is the simultaneous move of the decision of the tax rates, which end up with
the tax rates (tN1 , t
N
2 ) and the tax revenues (R
N
1 , R
N
2 ). If one country i chooses
Early and the other country j chooses Late, the tax competition is made by
the sequential decisions and ends up with the Stackelberg-equilibrium tax
rates (tLi , t
F
j ) and the tax revenues (R
L
i , R
F
j ). The relevant payoff structure
of the timing game is reduced to the following normal form:
country 2 (small)
Early Late
country 1 Early RN1 , R
N
2 R
L
1 , R
F
2
(large) Late RF1 , R
L
2 R
N
1 , R
N
2
In the Appendix we show the following:
They favor the welfare level of the small leadership equilibrium compared with that of the
large leadership equilibrium.
Interestingly enough the structure of our game is closer to Hvidt and Nielsen’s (2001)
cross-border shopping model where countries differ by population sizes. However, they are
interested by the different issue of a minimum commodity tax.
14However, as we shall see in Proposition 5.2, the small country gains when moving from
cooperation to competition.
13
Proposition 4.1 For all ² ∈ (0, 1) and δ < δ¯; (i) The Subgame Perfect
Equilibria (SPEs) of the timing game are the two Stackelberg Equilibria.
(ii) Moving sequentially instead of simultaneously is Pareto-superior for both
countries.
Therefore, a pre-play announcement is a commitment device that makes
countries better-off compared to the conventional benchmark of simultaneous-
move equilibrium. This is a partial form of coordination.
Due to the multiplicity of the equilibria of the timing game, a coordina-
tion issue appears regarding the equilibrium selection. We follow Harsanyi
and Selten (1988) and adopt their risk-dominance criterion to our setting as
follows:
Definition 4.1 An equilibrium risk-dominates another equilibrium when the
former is less risky than the latter, that is the risk-dominant equilibrium is
the one for which the product of the deviation losses of reverting to the Nash
equilibrium is the largest.
In our framework, equilibrium (Early, Late) risk-dominates equilibrium
(Late, Early) if the former is associated with the larger product of deviation
losses. Specifically:
Γ ≡ (RL1 −RN1 )(RF2 −RN2 )− (RF1 −RN1 )(RL2 −RN2 ) > 0 (6)
The value of RL1 −RN1 represents the threat of reverting to the Nash equilib-
rium when country 1 acts as a leader. The corresponding value for country
2 is RL2 − RN2 . The bigger the former is compared with the latter, the more
country 1 has to lose in case of deviation from pre-play choice (Early, Late).
The same explanation applies for RF2 −RN2 and RF1 −RN1 . In short, this cri-
terion aims for minimizing the risk of coordination failure. In the Appendix
we show the following:
Proposition 4.2 For all ² ∈ (0, 1) and δ < δ¯, the SPE where the large
country leads risk-dominates the other equilibrium.
The timing-game and risk dominance allow for a simple and natural ex-
planation for the endogenous emergence of the large country’s leadership in
the international tax competition. The point is similar to von Stackelberg’s
(1934) critique of Cournot’s duopoly that the large firm is the most natu-
ral leader of the price competition game. Since the first-mover advantage
is not observed in either country by Proposition 3.2(i), a possible Pareto-
dominating relationship between SPE’s obtained in Amir and Stepanova
(2006) and Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010, 2011) cannot arise in our model.
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It is worth noting that our result of risk-dominance is opposite to Kempf
and Rota-Graziosi (2011) where countries differ by population densities. It
is also opposite to Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010) where countries differ
in capital productivities. In both models, both countries are worse off when
the large country leads, so that the risk-dominance criterion supports the
SPE where the small country leads. We can attribute this peculiar result to
their implicit assumption of different tax response elasticities discussed after
Proposition 3.2.
5 Some policy issues
5.1 Total revenue and fiscal equalization
In terms of the total tax revenue the fiscal revenue gap among countries, we
can show the following:
Proposition 5.1 For all ² ∈ (0, 1) and δ < δ¯, (i) RL1 + RF2 > RF1 + RL2 >
RN1 +R
N
2 , and (ii) |RL1 −RF2 | < RF1 −RL2 .
The risk-dominating SPE is better both in terms of the sum of the tax
revenues and the revenue equalization. Thus tax leadership by the large
country helps to increase total tax revenue and to reduce the fiscal revenue
gap among countries. The reason of the fiscal equalization effect is that the
large country leadership benefits directly to the small country that gets the
second-mover advantage. The total revenue is maximized with tax leadership
by the large country because this induces the country with the larger tax base
to tax more.
5.2 Benefit from cooperation and minimal taxation
Another question is whether countries would benefit from cooperation, when
they both set the cooperative tax rates to1 = t
o
2 = 1 and get the respective tax
revenue, Ro1 = (1+²)/2, R
o
2 = (1−²)/2. Comparing this cooperative outcome
with the risk-dominating SPE outcome, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5.2 Ro1 > R
L
1 for all ² ∈ (0, 1) and δ < δ¯. For all ², there
exists δ(²) < δ¯ such that Ro2 < R
F
2 for all δ ∈ (δ(²), δ¯). δ(²) is decreasing in
² with δ(1) = 0.
The potential advantage of the small country is its lower tax rate, which
allows it to attract a fraction of the large country’s tax base. With tax
harmonization, this is no longer possible. Thus, unless the fiscal competition
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is too intense (low δ) or the country sizes are too close (low ²), the small
country prefers the competition outcome to the tax harmonization outcome.
Another issue is the potential benefit of imposing a minimal tax rate.
In the cross-border transaction model a` la Kanbur and Keen (1993) with a
revenue maximizing government, imposing a minimum commodity tax rate
has the striking feature that both the small and the large countries could
gain. The large country becomes less constrained by the threat of outward
tax shopping and thus it chooses higher tax rate. The small country also
benefits because of the induced increase in the tax rate in the large country
thereby increasing the inward tax shopping. However, this does not extend
to a Stackelberg setting in which the large country is assumed to be the
leader (see Wang 1999 and Hvidt and Nielsen 2001). Without assuming
leadership by the large country, we can prove similar result in our model
with the endogenous tax leadership by the large country. The proof of the
result is available upon request. We do not reproduce it here because it is
very similar to Hvidt and Nielsen (2001).
6 Conclusion
“Multi-speed” Europe is used to describe the method of enhanced coop-
eration in Europe whereby common objectives are pursued by a group of
Member States both able and willing to advance, it being implied that the
others will follow later. The Member States concerned can thus move for-
ward at different speeds with a sense of leadership. In this broad context of
multi-speed cooperation in Europe, we evaluate the scope for international
tax leadership to confront the increasing difficulty member states face in tax-
ing global corporations. With globalization, capital is becoming increasingly
mobile, but globalization also makes it easier for multinational companies to
shift income and profit across branches to minimize their total tax liabilities.
Some authors have recently shown that tax leadership is not only natural
but could even be beneficial (which refers to a first-mover advantage). Wang
(1999) asserts that “it is natural and conceivable that, in a real-world situa-
tion of tax setting, the large region moves first” (p. 974). This conjecture was
recently turned on its head by Kemp and Rota-Graziosi (2010) who find in
a capital mobility model that leadership by the small region is, in fact, the
most likely outcome. In this paper, we build upon a profit mobility model, to
demonstrate that sequential move always dominates simultaneous tax game.
However, we find that tax leadership by the large is preferable to tax lead-
ership by the small in terms of risk dominance. This finding is opposite to
the one of Kemp and Rota-Graziosi (2010). We attribute the difference to
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the implicit assumption they make on the tax response elasticity. In their
model, the tax rate of the large country is more sensitive to the tax rate of
the other country. Therefore, relative to a Nash equilibrium, tax leadership
by the small can induce a greater favorable reaction in the tax rate of the
following large country, than the other way round. In our model, the tax
responsiveness of each country is the same, and the leadership of the large
country emerges as a pure size effect.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: (i) tF1 − tN1 = δ
(
5 + ²
4
− 3 + ²
3
)
=
δ
12
(3− ²) > 0, and
tL1 − tF1 = δ
(
3 + ²
2
− 5 + ²
4
)
=
δ
4
(1+ ²) > 0. tF2 − tN2 = δ
(
5− ²
4
− 3− ²
3
)
=
δ
12
(3 + ²) > 0, and tL2 − tF2 = δ
(
3− ²
2
− 5− ²
4
)
=
δ
4
(1 − ²) > 0. (ii)
tN1 − tN2 =
2δ
3
² > 0, tL1 − tF2 =
δ
4
(1 + 3²) > 0. tF1 − tL2 =
δ
4
(3²− 1) < 0 if and
only if ² < 1/3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.2: (i) RF1 − RL1 = δ
(
1
32
(5 + ²)2 − 1
16
(3 + ²)2
)
=
δ
32
(−(1 + ²)2 + 8) > 0 and RF2 − RL2 = δ
(
1
32
(5− ²)2 − 1
16
(3− ²)2
)
=
δ
32
(−(1−²)2+8) > 0. (ii) RN1 −RN2 = δ
(
1
18
(3 + ²)2 − 1
18
(3− ²)2
)
=
2δ
3
² >
0, RF1 −RL2 =
δ
32
(−(11− ²)2+128) > 0, and RL1 −RF2 =
δ
32
((11+ ²)2− 128).
For ² ∈ (0, 1), the last equation derives RL1 − RF2 ≷ 0 ⇐⇒ ² ≷ −11 + 8
√
2,
which is (5). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.1: If country 1 chooses Early, since RF2 − RN2 =
δ
288
(3 + ²)(27 − 7²) > 0, country 2 chooses Late. If country 2 chooses Late,
since RL1 − RN1 =
δ
144
(3 + ²)2 > 0, country 1 chooses Early. Therefore, the
pair of (Early, Late) constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium. In the same
way, the pair of (Late, Early) constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Simultaneous move is never an equilibrium. This completes part (i) of the
proposition. Part (ii) comes from Figure 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.2: Γ =
δ
144
(3+ ²)2 ∗ δ
288
(3+ ²)(27−7²)− δ
288
(3−
17
²)(27+7²)∗ δ
144
(3−²)2 = 1
144 ∗ 288δ
2((3 + ²)3(27− 7²)− (3− ²)3(27 + 7²)) =
1
576
δ2²(15− ²2) > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.1: RL1 + R
F
2 = δ
(
1
16
(3 + ²)2 +
1
32
(5− ²)2
)
=
1
32
δ(43 + 2²+ 3²2), RF1 +R
L
2 = δ
(
1
32
(5 + ²)2 +
1
16
(3− ²)2
)
=
1
32
δ(43− 2²+ 3²2)
and RN1 + R
N
2 = δ
(
1
18
(3 + ²)2 +
1
18
(3− ²)2
)
= δ
(
1 +
1
9
²2
)
. Clearly RL1 +
RF2 > R
F
1 +R
L
2 , and (R
F
1 +R
L
2 )− (RN1 +RN2 ) = δ
(
− 5δ
288
²2 − δ
16
²+
11
32
)
=
1
288
δ(5²+ 33)(3− ²) > 0. As to the differences in the tax revenue, for ² < ²∗,
RF2 > R
L
1 and (R
F
1 − RL2 ) − (RF2 − RL1 ) =
11
8
δ² > 0, and for ² ≥ ²∗,
(RF1 −RL2 )− (RL1 −RF2 ) =
δ
16
(7− ²2) > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.2: For country 1, RL1 −
1 + ²
2
=
1
16
(
δ(3 + ²)2 − 8(1 + ²)) ≤
−1
8
(1 + 3²) < 0 for all δ ≤ δ¯.
For country 2,
RF2 −
1− ²
2
=
1
32
(δ(5− ²)2 − 16(1− ²)) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ δ ≤ 16(1− ²)
(5− ²)2 ≡ δ(²).
δ(²) < δ¯ for all ², with δ(1) = 0. Q.E.D.
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